An Absurd Consequence of Stanford’s New Induction Over the History of Science: A Reply to Sterpetti In the Introduction section, 6th point under the paragraph “Given the parallels between Stanford’s PUA and the PUO, and those between Stanford’s NIS and the NIP, I have sketched the following reductio against Stanford’s NIS (Mizrahi 2016a, pp. 63–64):….. should read as

Hume’s Conceivability Arguments Reconsidered Abstract This paper examines Hume’s formulations and uses of the conceivability principle (abbreviated as CP: Whatever is conceivable is possible) and the inconceivability principle (abbreviated as ICP: Whatever is inconceivable is impossible). In Hume’s works, we identify different versions of CP and ICP, including proper CP, proper ICP, the weak versions of CP and ICP, the epistemic versions of CP and ICP, and show that Hume not only expresses ICP, but also really maintains it. Assuming an axiomatic characterization of modalities, we argue that if there is a sharp distinction between levels of modalities, then Hume’s conceivability arguments do not hold. But, in a rather different way, we also argue that if Hume’s conceivability arguments hold, then there should be no distinction between levels of modalities. Finally, we argue that after Hume, there are lots of endeavors in logic and philosophy to distinguish different levels of modalities, and to accept new concepts of necessity other than logical necessity.

The Role of Intuition in Gödel’s and Robinson’s Points of View Abstract Before Abraham Robinson and Kurt Gödel became familiar with Paul Cohen’s Results, both logicians held a naïve Platonic approach to philosophy. In this paper I demonstrate how Cohen’s results influenced both of them. Robinson declared himself a Formalist, while Gödel basically continued to hold onto the old Platonic approach. Why were the reactions of Gödel and Robinson to Cohen’s results so drastically different in spite of the fact that their initial philosophical positions were remarkably similar? I claim that the key to these different responses stems from the meanings that Gödel and Robinson gave to the concept of intuition, as well as to the relationship between epistemology and ontology. I also illustrate that although it might initially appear that Gödel’s and Robinson’s positions after Cohen’s results were quite different, this was not necessarily the case.

Existential Quantifier and Ontological Pluralism Abstract Within the context of the debate between ontological monists and pluralists the paper discusses a number of argumentative strategies that the latter can apply to answer the “there can be only one” argument. I show here that the reply to this argument suggested by J. Turner has its disadvantages and suggest a number of adjustments thereof. In particular, I develop a concept of domain-specific quantifiers that allow the pluralist to elaborate his or her ontological position.

The Parthood of Indiscernibles Abstract In the following work we propose to incorporate the main feature of quantum mechanics, i.e., the concept of indiscernibility. To achieve this goal, first we present two models of set theories: a quasi-set theory (QST) and a non-antisymmetric mereology (NAM). Next, we show how specific objects of QST—m-atoms—can be defined within NAM. Finally, we introduce a concept of a parthood of indiscernibles and discuss its features in respect to standard notions of indiscernibles and within NAM.

A Scientific Metaphysics and Ockham’s Razor Abstract I argue that although Ockham’s Razor (OR) has its origins in a-priorist ontological mandates according to the purposes of natural theology and natural philosophy as influenced by it, the principle has taken on significant empirical and contingent materialist connotations and conceptual content since the scientific revolution. I briefly discuss the pluralism of the concept of OR historically and in contemporary science and philosophy. I then attempt to align scientific metaphysics with contemporary conceptions of OR, and to demonstrate that ontic parsimony is an indispensable element of scientific (contingent and anti-a-priorist) metaphysics. I then further deploy that scientific metaphysics to propose a contingently grounded semi-formal approach, with set theoretic features, and then with information theoretic features, to provide a way of assessing when a scientific theory and its ontology are aligned with OR appropriately in the context of the proposed scientific metaphysics.

An Absurd Consequence of Stanford’s New Induction Over the History of Science: A Reply to Sterpetti Abstract In this paper, I respond to Sterpetti’s (Axiomathes, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-018-9392-4) attempt to defend Kyle P. Stanford’s Problem of Unconceived Alternatives and his New Induction over the History of Science (NIS) from my reductio argument outlined in Mizrahi (J Gen Philos Sci 47(1):59–68, 2016a). I discuss what I take to be the ways in which Sterpetti has misconstrued my argument against Stanford’s NIS, in particular, that it is a reductio, not a dilemma, as Sterpetti erroneously thinks. I argue that antirealists who endorse Stanford’s NIS still face an absurd consequence of this argument, namely, that they should not believe their own brand of scientific antirealism.

Goldbach’s Conjecture as a ‘Transcendental’ Theorem Abstract Goldbach’s conjecture, if not read in number theory (mathematical level), but in a precise foundation theory of mathematics (meta-mathematical level), that refers to the metaphysical ‘theory of the participation’ of Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), poses a surprising analogy between the category of the quantity, within which the same arithmetic conjecture is formulated, and the transcendental/formal dimension. It says: every even number is ‘like’ a two, that is: it has the form-of-two. And that means: it is the composition of two units; not two equal arithmetic units (two numbers ‘one’), but two different formal-transcendental units, which are, in arithmetic, two prime numbers.

Strong Pluralism, Coincident Objects and Haecceitism Abstract According to strong pluralism, objects distinct by virtue of their modal properties can coincide. The most common objection towards such view invokes the so-called Grounding Problem according to which the strong pluralist needs to explain what the grounds are for supposed modal differences between the coincidents. As recognized in the literature, the failure to provide an answer to the Grounding Problem critically undermines the plausibility of strong pluralism. Moreover, there are strong reasons to believe that strong pluralists cannot provide an explanation of the Grounding Problem. In this paper, we argue that strong pluralism can be motivated independently of the successful answer to the Grounding Problem. In order to achieve that aim, we provide a haecceitistic interpretation of strong pluralism according to which strong pluralism should be read as a position committed to the existence of primitive individuals, i.e., the individuals that have their criteria of individuation independently of their qualitative profiles. That said, we do not aim at defending haecceitism. Instead, our aim is rather modest: we want to provide a new way for the strong pluralist to supplement his view to make it more watertight.

Challenges for a Pragmatic Philosophy of New Technologies Abstract An epistemology mainly oriented at a philosophical discussion of natural sciences and technology is sketched out on the basis of the author’s “methodological scheme-interpretationism” combining a realistic and a perspectival pragmatic approach. - In the main part, 12 characteristic features of the New Technologies are presented and discussed as, e.g., operationalization, computerization, models and modularity, virtuality and artificiality, interdisciplinary interaction, comprehensive and complex systems, telematization and remote control, robotics and AI technology and automatization as well as “socio-eco-techno-systems”, technology-driven globalization and the respective problems of individual and social responsibility. - Also, actual trends are listed and future tasks for the international ecological cooperation of states, UN and UNESCO bodies under urgent guidelines of humanitarian values and “practical/concrete humanity” are recommended.